Special Warfare
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U. S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins
Author: Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.
language: en
Publisher: The Minerva Group, Inc.
Release Date: 2002-04
Colonel Paddock traces the origins of Army special warfare from 1941 to 1952, the year the Armys special warfare center was established. While the Army had experience in psychological warfare, the major recent U. S. experience in unconventional warfare had been in the Office of Strategic Services, a civilian agency, during World War II. Many army leaders, trained and experienced in conventional warfare, hesitantly accepted psychological warfare as a legitimate weapon in the Armys wartime arsenal, but questioned the validity and appropriateness of the Armys adoption of unconventional operations. The continuing tensions of the cold war and hostilities in Korea resolved the ambivalence in favor of coordinating in a single operation the techniques of both types of warfare. Colonel Paddocks extensively documented work traces a portion of a brief episode in our Nations military hisotyr, but an instructive one. For the historian and military scholar, it provides the necessary backdrop for understanding the subsequent evolution of the Armys special warefare capability. For the national security policymaker, it suggests the value of the innovative impulse and the need for receptivity to new ideas and adaptability to change. John S. Pustay Lieutenant General, United States Air Force President, National Defense University
Spec Ops
Vice Adm. William H. McRaven helped to devise the strategy for how to bring down Osama bin Laden, and commanded the courageous U.S. military unit that carried it out on May 1, 2011, ending one of the greatest manhunts in history. In Spec Ops, a well-organized and deeply researched study, McRaven analyzes eight classic special operations. Six are from WWII: the German commando raid on the Belgian fort Eben Emael (1940); the Italian torpedo attack on the Alexandria harbor (1941); the British commando raid on Nazaire, France (1942); the German glider rescue of Benito Mussolini (1943); the British midget-submarine attack on the Tirpitz (1943); and the U.S. Ranger rescue mission at the Cabanatuan POW camp in the Philippines (1945). The two post-WWII examples are the U.S. Army raid on the Son Tay POW camp in North Vietnam (1970) and the Israeli rescue of the skyjacked hostages in Entebbe, Uganda (1976). McRaven—who commands a U.S. Navy SEAL team—pinpoints six essential principles of “spec ops” success: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed and purpose. For each of the case studies, he provides political and military context, a meticulous reconstruction of the mission itself and an analysis of the operation in relation to his six principles. McRaven deems the Son Tay raid “the best modern example of a successful spec op [which] should be considered textbook material for future missions.” His own book is an instructive textbook that will be closely studied by students of the military arts. Maps, photos.
U.S. Army Special Warfare Its Origin
Colonel Paddock traces the origins of Army special warfare from 1941 to 1952, the year the Army's special warfare center was established. While the Army had experience in psychological warfare, the major recent U. S. experience in unconventional warfare had been in the Office of Strategic Services, a civilian agency, during World War II. Many army leaders, trained and experienced in conventional warfare, hesitantly accepted psychological warfare as a legitimate weapon in the Army's wartime arsenal, but questioned the validity and appropriateness of the Army's adoption of unconventional operations. The continuing tensions of the cold war and hostilities in Korea resolved the ambivalence in favor of coordinating in a single operation the techniques of both types of warfare. Colonel Paddocks extensively documented work traces a portion of a brief episode in our Nation's military history, but an instructive one. For the historian and military scholar, it provides the necessary backdrop for understanding the subsequent evolution of the Army's special warfare capability. For the national security policymaker, it suggests the value of the innovative impulse and the need for receptivity to new ideas and adaptability to change. John S. Pustay Lieutenant General, United States Air Force
